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Abstract
In 1971, after more than a decade of national and municipal policies aimed at the top-down removal 
of shantytowns, the Buenos Aires City Council approved the Plan Piloto para la Relocalización 
de Villa 7 (Pilot Plan for the Relocation of Shantytown 7; 1971–1975, referred to as the Pilot Plan 
hereinafter).  This particular plan, which resulted in the construction of the housing complex, Barrio 
Justo Suárez, endures in the collective memory of Argentines as a landmark project regarding 
grassroots participation in state housing initiatives addressed at shantytowns. Emerging from a 
context of a housing shortage for the growing urban poor and intense popular mobilizations during 
the transition to democracy, the authors of the Pilot Plan sought to empower shantytown residents 
in novel ways by: 1) maintaining the shantytown’s location as opposed to eradication schemes 
that relocated the residents elsewhere, 2) formally employing some of the residents for the stage of 
construction, as opposed to “self-help” housing projects in which the residents contributed with 
unpaid labor, and 3) including them in the urban and architectural design of the of the new housing. 
This paper will examine the context in which the Pilot Plan was conceived of as a way of re-assessing 
the roles of the state, the user, and housing-related professionals, often seen as antagonistic. The 
paper argues that residents’ fair participation and state intervention in housing schemes are not 
necessarily incompatible, and can function in specific social and political contexts through multi-
actor proposals backed by a political will that prioritizes grassroots agency.
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Introduction
In 1971, after more than a decade of national and municipal policies aimed 
at the top-down removal of shantytowns, the Buenos Aires City Council 
approved the Plan Piloto para la Relocalización de Villa 7 (Pilot Plan for 
the Relocation of Shantytown 7; 1971–1975, referred to as the Pilot Plan 
hereinafter). This particular plan, which resulted in the construction of the 
housing complex, Barrio Justo Suárez, endures in the collective memory of 
Argentines as a landmark project regarding grassroots participation in state 
housing initiatives addressed at shantytowns. Emerging from a context of 
a housing shortage for the growing urban poor and intense popular mobi-
lizations during the transition to democracy, the authors of the Pilot Plan 
sought to empower shantytown residents in novel ways by: 1) maintaining 
the shantytown’s location as opposed to eradication schemes that relocated 
the residents elsewhere, 2) formally employing some of the residents for the 
stage of construction, as opposed to “self-help” housing projects in which the 
residents contributed with unpaid labor, and 3) including them in the urban 
and architectural design of the of the new housing. 
This approach responded to key demands of the shantytown’s population, 
their local committees, and umbrella organizations, with whom the archi-
tects of the Pilot Plan had previously collaborated. At the same time, the 
Pilot Plan reflected the contemporary debate amongst architects, planners, 
and policy makers regarding the role of the user, which continues to this day. 
It is possible to identify here two conflicting views on the scope and the polit-
ical implications of users’ participation in housing production: one which 
conceives of such participation as one more aspect within a general process 
of empowerment of the working classes, and the other, which inscribes it 
within a political project aimed at preserving the status quo either directly or 
indirectly, by limiting user participation to the construction of housing while 
DOI: 10.14324/111.444.amps.2017v12i4.001
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excluding them from the planning and design phases. It is worth mention-
ing that the latter approach also considers politics to be beyond the scope 
of architects and planners. The Pilot Plan represents the former approach, 
emphasizing the importance of residents’ participation as a driving force for 
social change.1  
This paper will examine the context in which the Pilot Plan was conceived 
of as a way of re-assessing the roles of the state, the user, and housing-related 
professionals, often seen as antagonistic. The paper argues that residents’ fair 
participation and state intervention in housing schemes are not necessarily 
incompatible, as will be shown through the unique example of the Pilot Plan. 
At the same time, it is understood that the political conditions necessary for 
state departments, agents, and residents to collaborate towards social change 
present themselves only on rare occasions. The research presented here will 
offer a twofold contribution to the specialized literature. First, it will con-
tribute to the contemporary, international discussion on the politics of user 
participation in architectural design through the analysis of a historical case 
study in Argentina. Second, it will contribute to the specialized literature on 
urban informality and state-led housing initiatives for shantytowns by intro-
ducing the Pilot Plan to an international English-speaking audience. Despite 
being a well-known example of grassroots participation amongst Argentine 
architects, studies devoted to the Pilot Plan in Spanish are extremely scarce,2 
and there is currently no research about the Pilot Plan or its protagonists 
published in English.  
Argentine Politics, Housing, and “Eradication” Schemes
The Pilot Plan was designed by an independent, interdisciplinary team led 
by architects Osvaldo Cedrón and Alberto Compagnucci during the last 
years of the military dictatorship “Revolución Argentina” (1966–1973). 
The political landscape of Argentina at the time was one marked by mass 
protests, demonstrations, and both peaceful and violent social movements 
against the dictatorship. The protests denounced the curtailment of workers’ 
rights, the decline in real incomes, the general climate of oppression, and not 
least, the proscription of Peronism (formally known as the Justicialist Party 
from 1947 onwards), the political party of Juan Domingo Perón (President of 
Argentina, 1946–1952, 1952–1955). Perón’s second elected term as president 
had been interrupted in 1955 by a coup d’état, the Revolución Libertadora, 
which banned his political party and forced him into exile. However, Perón 
remained extremely popular amongst Argentine working classes for the wide 
range of public projects he implemented during his tenure as president – 
from increasing access to social security and social healthcare programs, 
to improving working conditions and raising real wages.  His approach to 
governance generated a discourse around the use of public space, and raised 
the morale of millions of working-class Argentines, giving them a sense of 
political empowerment.3 
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Throughout Perón’s administration, however, Argentine shantytowns 
grew at a rapid pace due to the industrialization of the Argentine economy 
and the consequential influx of migrants leaving the countryside in search of 
stable, paid jobs in cities that were unprepared to receive such a rapid influx 
of population. While Perón’s government did not articulate a specific policy 
towards the shantytowns, it did focus on offering mass social housing and 
accessible state mortgages.4
The Revolución Libertadora that overthrew Perón (not to be confused 
with the Revolución Argentina) was the first to address Argentine shanty-
towns as a specific target for government policy. It did so by starting from 
the assumption that the role of the state was to “eradicate” them, demolish-
ing the existing shacks and relocating their residents to purpose-built social 
housing. It also assumed that shantytown residents were largely responsible 
for their poor living conditions, and that the layout and the design of new 
housing could change their social habits.5 Financial constraints and changes 
in policy direction meant that only a small proportion of the program was 
implemented, however.6 Throughout the rest of the 1950s and the 1960s the 
government’s interest in eradication was maintained, though there were brief 
instances under the governments of Arturo Frondizi (President, 1958–1962) 
and Arturo Illia (President, 1963–1966), for example, in which local admin-
istrations or national departments provided free materials to residents who 
contributed to the housing projects with free labor.7 
The Revolución Argentina, which put General Juan Carlos Onganía in 
power in 1966, represented a turning point in state policy towards shanty-
towns. Returning to the approach of the Revolución Libertadora, govern-
ment action was exclusively one of eradication. An overarching official 
program of shantytown eradication was launched in Buenos Aires under 
the new regime, combining national funding and municipal implementation: 
the Plan de Erradicación de Villas de Emergencia (Shantytown Eradication 
Plan).8 “Eradication” included the forceful eviction of shantytown resi-
dents, sometimes through the use of military force, and their relocation to 
purpose-built social housing. The shantytown dwellings, meanwhile, were 
demolished. The new social housing complexes presented, in most cases, 
serious problems to the shantytowns’ population. First, although subsidized, 
the housing unit prices were often too high for shantytown residents.9 While 
this may seem contradictory, governments were anxious to recover the funds 
invested in housing, and for this reason, rather than targeting those most 
in need – families with the lowest and most unstable incomes – they envis-
aged social housing users to be low income, but at the same time capable of 
making regular payments. Secondly, many of these complexes were located 
far from employment sources and, moreover, from essential public facilities 
such as schools, hospitals, or leisure areas. Even more worryingly, evicted 
shantytown residents were not offered permanent housing in most cases, and 
were instead housed in temporary shacks offered by the state, which, in effect 
replicated the problem.10 
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These eradication schemes, like those under the Revolución Libertadora, 
were based on a conception of the shantytown resident as indolent and 
therefore responsible for their poverty and the precarious conditions of their 
living environments.11 They also conveyed the underlying idea that shanty-
town dwellers followed cultural patterns that needed to be forcibly altered; 
however, rather than seeking to modify their behavior through housing 
design, they envisioned social re-programming as being carried out directly by 
social workers. In one of these documents, for example, it is stated that “the 
social environment of the villas miseria [. . .] contributes to worsening [resi-
dents’] natural tendencies and transforming these slums into permanent foci 
of epidemics and moral degradation: urgent action is required for the social 
re-adaptation of the majority of their inhabitants.”12 
Shantytown organizations and advocates who dared to voice their opposi-
tion to these eradication initiatives were often harassed or silenced by other 
means. Local governments, for example, tried to intervene in shantytown 
committees’ elections in order to promote leaders who adhered to their eradi-
cation plans, refusing all dialogue with committees that did not accept this 
procedure.13 Meanwhile, the police intensified their harassment of shanty-
town residents; it was not unusual, for example, for the most active residents 
to be arrested by police officers and retained in prison for short periods with 
no formal reasons, denouncements, or court procedures.14 The repression also 
reached external organizations. For example, on December 20, 1968, twenty-
one priests from the politically active Movimiento de Sacerdotes para el 
Tercer Mundo (Movement of Priests for the Third World) sent a formal letter 
to the Onganía requesting him to cease the eradication programs, and silently 
stood in front of the Casa Rosada, the official presidential residence, as a 
means of protesting. These priests, many of whom had worked in the villas 
miserias, continued their protests by distributing leaflets about their cause to 
passers-by in the adjacent Plaza de Mayo and by organizing hunger strikes 
around Buenos Aires.15 By January, those higher up in the hierarchy of the 
Catholic Church had issued a statement forbidding the priests to “participate 
in any public acts or distribute resolutions concerning the social, economic, 
or political order without prior authorization of the archbishop, Cardinal 
Primate Antonio Caggiano,” who was a known supporter of Onganía.
In the midst of this rising tide of popular mobilizations, the military gov-
ernment was ultimately forced to make concessions in an attempt to pacify 
society, including lifting the proscription of Peronism, and holding open elec-
tions in 1973.16 It was in this highly turbulent period in which the Pilot Plan 
was conceived and eventually executed. The lead architect, Cedrón, presented 
the Pilot Plan to the municipal authorities, and it was unexpectedly approved 
in 1971 by Mayor Saturnino Montero Ruiz. Those who took part in the Plan 
perceived Ruiz’s approval as motivated by his ambition to work with the then 
dictator Agustín Lanusse, who planned to run for the presidency during the 
transition to democracy. Montero Ruiz’s policies towards shantytowns had 
up until that point followed those of the Revolución Argentina by locally 
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implementing the eradication plan, which had become extremely unpopular. 
Thus, the mayor’s support of the Pilot Plan could be read as an attempt to 
gain popular votes.17
Given the political context described above, the Pilot Plan represented a 
striking innovation as a state-sponsored initiative addressed at shantytowns. 
Rather than forcibly clearing the shantytown and evicting its residents, it pro-
posed providing housing units where the villa was located (or, alternatively, 
in the closest available plot), and rather than excluding the residents, their 
participation was conceived of as the leading element in the design process. 
In the Pilot Plan for Villa 7, the professionals involved not only consulted the 
shantytown dwellers about the project and invited them to participate in its 
realization, but also physically moved their offices to the shantytown to work 
in a routine that allowed daily contact. 
Discussions on Self-Help and the Role of the User in the Cold 
War Era
In parallel to the implementation of eradication policies in Argentina during 
the 1950s and 1960s, and the emergence of the Pilot Plan in the 1970s, a differ-
ent and more conservative notion of user participation was being discussed 
and developed in inter-American agencies. Such discussion had stemmed 
from the idea of aided self-help and the early antecedent of the “land and 
utility” projects implemented in Puerto Rico in the early 1940s. Through 
these projects, the government purchased large tracts of undeveloped land 
in and around urban areas, and provided it with essential infrastructure 
before subdividing it and offering it for rent or sale to low-income families, 
who were then responsible for moving their old homes to the site or building 
new ones.18 Similar projects called “aided self-help subdivisions” were also 
put into practice in urban areas of Puerto Rico with smaller populations. 
However, on these government-provided parcels of land, the residents were 
expected to install the essential infrastructure, including potable water and 
sewage systems.19
Despite having a unique geopolitical landscape, the Puerto Rico programs 
that engaged residents in the construction of their housing served as inspira-
tion for government-aided self-help programs in other parts of Latin America, 
particularly after the Second World War when the leaders of the US and 
Latin American countries made a united effort to create more formal systems 
of coordinating a wide range of inter-American activities.20 The role of users’ 
participation was discussed with increasing interest amongst inter-American 
organizations composed of high-level government officials from the US and 
Latin America who organized a multitude of specialized conferences. Even 
though some of these institutions had only recently been established, the fact 
that they were mostly composed of people who were already in positions of 
great power in the US and Latin America made them extremely influential, 
as the ideas they brainstormed in conferences could be immediately put into 
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practice. The Division of Housing and Planning of the OAS Inter-American 
Economic and Social Council (IA-EcoSoc) is a key example, and relevant to 
this paper. 
The US interest in these projects must be understood in the context of the 
Cold War. Through these programs, the US sought to simultaneously main-
tain or improve US–Latin American relations and business activity while also 
containing the increasing interest in communism throughout Latin America, 
which was perceived as a threat to established trade relations. While Latin 
American governments had more obvious interests in alleviating their respec-
tive housing crises, identifying economically viable solutions to the problems 
of shantytowns – namely in the form of these self-help housing programs – 
was a way to minimize discontent amongst the growing urban poor. The 
increasing importance given to the principle of “self-help” was made evident 
through the establishment of the Centro Interamericano de la Vivienda 
(CINVA; also known as the Inter-American Housing Center) at the National 
University of Colombia in 1951 through the OAS Program of Technical 
Cooperation.21 CINVA quickly developed a reputation amongst Argentine 
professionals interested in self-construction, as one of the leading Argentine 
modernist architects at the time, Ernesto Vautier, had worked there between 
1953 and 1961.22 The research projects at CINVA were heavily influenced 
by the aforementioned Puerto Rican “land and utilities” projects, and were 
known for their experimentation in the technical aspects of housing construc-
tion and finance. CINVA played a crucial role by training Latin American 
planners in self-help.23 
Later, at the Tenth Inter-American Conference (Caracas, 1954), the 
IA-EcoSoc presented a report analysing the incongruence between the costs 
of construction and the residents’ incomes.24 The report celebrated self-help 
housing initiatives and low-interest loans funded internally by their respective 
countries, and insisted on the standardization of materials as a way of reduc-
ing building costs. However, despite acknowledging the fact that economic 
inequality was the main cause of the housing shortage in Latin America, the 
IA-EcoSoc considered the economic, social, and political issues as beyond its 
scope, and focused only on the technical aspects of housing production. A 
similar view can be found in the conclusions of the First Technical Meeting 
Inter-American Housing and Planning (Bogotá), organized by the IA-EcoSoc 
two years later, in 1956. It is noteworthy, then, that the contributions offered 
by these agencies in relation to users’ participation implied the perpetuation 
of the status quo in structural social and economic terms. 
Though funding these new housing programs in Latin America was a con-
tinual source of discussion amongst the inter-American agencies and Latin 
American government representatives, the US had been reluctant to give 
financial aid. This had been a point of contention that became particularly 
evident in the aforementioned Tenth Inter-American Conference, where 
Latin-American countries, overwhelmed with growing poverty, sought finan-
cial aid, while the US aimed at curbing the advance of communism without 
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committing any funding.25 The increasing anxiety in the US after the Cuban 
Revolution (1953–1959), when Fidel Castro aligned himself with the Soviet 
Union, however, led to the launch of an inter-American program of financial 
aid called the Alliance for Progress in 1961. This program, administered by 
the Inter-American Development Bank, offered $20 billion in loans to Latin-
American governments over a period of ten years, under the condition that 
Latin-American countries would contribute $80 billion over the same period 
of time. The financial commitment of the US was with the intention of secur-
ing their business and trade interests there as well as of combating the rising 
civil unrest and anti-American sentiment in Latin America.26 According to 
the Encyclopedia of the Inter-American System, the Alliance for Progress 
“sought national development and stability through political democratiza-
tion, economic growth, and social reform. The armed forces were to focus 
on counterinsurgency, not only through military force but civic action pro-
grams (such as literacy and technical training, infrastructure projects, and 
other activities beneficial to civilians).”27 While representing improvements 
to eradication of housing schemes, once again the projects that would be 
funded through the Alliance for Progress had political motivations that were 
ultimately anti-revolutionary. 
One of the Argentine housing projects partially funded by the Alliance for 
Progress included the Asistencia Técnica, Esfuerzo Propio y Ayuda Mutua 
(ATEPAM: literally, Technical Assistance, Own Effort and Mutual Help) – a 
program launched in 1962 which engaged users in the construction of their 
own housing.28 Their participation, however, was strictly limited to unpaid 
construction labor. The architectural projects and the distribution of land 
and construction materials were developed and administered centrally by 
the Instituto de la Vivienda de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (IVBA; Housing 
Institute of the Province of Buenos Aires), which was founded in 1956 for 
the purpose of “advising, coordinating and promoting private initiative for 
the acquisition and/or construction of housing.”29 The ATEPAM repre-
sents the main built antecedent for the Pilot Plan. Its director, Hilario Zalba 
(1912–1995), who also served as the President of the IVBA (1958–1962), was 
an architect and mentor to some of the authors of the Pilot Plan.30 Zalba 
also taught at the Faculty of Architecture and Urbanism of the National 
University of La Plata (FAU/UNLP), approaching the question of the role 
of the user from quite a different angle from that of the IA-EcoSoc. As early 
as 1947 Zalba and his team had stressed the importance of the social role of 
architecture, and the constant contact between its teaching and real-world 
issues such as social inequality.31 This represented an innovation in a context 
where most architectural curricula were inward looking, focused on discus-
sions of architectural style. After 1961, Zalba’s work in the FAU/UNLP 
was resumed by architects Juan Molina y Vedia and Marcos Winograd, 
known for their writings and activism in self-construction and housing.32 
Quite importantly, however, the interdisciplinary methodology advocated 
by those at FAU/UNLP viewed the sociological and economics components 
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differently. In contrast to the top-down approach, in which the goals were 
to change user habits and culture in order to preserve the existing political 
order, users’ participation in design was addressed in relation to its potential 
to radically transform the social and economic structure. The main authors of 
the Pilot Plan, Cedrón and Compagnucci, together with other members of the 
team such as Ana Azzarri, were trained in this academic milieu. 
At the international level, John F. C. Turner’s works and writing had a 
notable influence on the ideas of Cedrón, Compagnucci, and their team’s 
views in regards to grassroots participation in design. Turner was trained as 
an architect in 1950s’ England, amidst the discourse surrounding the archi-
tectural vernacular, human scale, and the human aspects of architecture 
initiated by Team 10.33 In the early 1960s, Turner was invited to take part 
in a state housing project in Arequipa, Peru, where he became acquainted 
with the idea of self-help housing as it was conceived of in the Americas.34 
Fascinated with Peruvian shantytowns, Turner celebrated residents’ creativ-
ity and effectiveness in achieving their own housing solutions and became an 
advocate of self-construction, although not necessarily as organized by the 
state as inter-American agencies promoted. Rather, Turner believed in the 
de-centralization of housing decisions, and of government power generally.35 
He became a central figure in the discussion about users’ participation in the 
Americas by the mid-1970s, and was particularly influential in Argentine 
architectural circles.36
Perhaps what most deeply marked the formation of the architects who took 
part in the Pilot Plan, however, was their voluntary work at shantytowns, 
and their engagement with radicalized political movements in Argentina. 
Cedrón, in particular, was affiliated with the Frente Villero Peronista para la 
Liberación (FVLP; Peronist Shantytowns Front for Liberation), which later 
merged with the Movimiento Villero Peronista (MVP; Peronist Shantytowns 
Movement). These were shantytown movements strongly linked to Peronism 
that were created and developed by local residents who opposed shantytown 
eradication plans and advocated for state support for shantytown improve-
ments, and the creation of shantytown construction cooperatives, amongst 
other things.37 Cedrón’s connection to them meant that he was campaigning 
for residents’ participation in shantytown improvements at the same time as 
advocating lifting the ban on Peronism in politics. The design team’s political 
identification with Peronism says something about their conception of partic-
ipation. Peronism had offered the working class a say in political debates, and 
its banning in 1956 meant a removal of its supporters, mostly workers, from 
political participation. By conceiving the Pilot Plan from this political angle, 
Cedrón and the team were interweaving design and political engagement.
The Housing Design of Villa 7
The design team’s perspective on participation influenced the development of 
the Pilot Plan in several concrete ways. First, from the outset of the program, 
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the team aimed to get closer to the users, transforming them into partici-
pants – although not the sole participants – in all the stages of development 
of the project. In this way, the Pilot Plan was different from most self-help 
programs, where users only contributed with labor. It was also different from 
programs where architects merely drew what residents drafted. In addition, 
rather than using the offices they had been offered at the municipal headquar-
ters, the members of the design team recycled an abandoned wagon into an 
improvised studio and carried out the design process within the shantytown 
grounds. In fact, they were independent professionals who had been hired by 
the municipality for the Pilot Plan specifically, but who had their own ideas 
about how to carry out the Plan. This, in the longer run, led both to tensions 
and to friendships with members of staff who worked for the municipality.38 
In the shorter term, it made the process of collaborative design dynamic and 
thorough.
The design that resulted from this collaboration showed significant design 
innovations in contrast to the more rigid models of the social housing pro-
jects of the time. Regarding the number of rooms, the units responded to 
the actual sizes of the families to be housed, not to abstract models. Up until 
this point, social housing units were frequently designed for generic nuclear 
families (couples with a number of children), ignoring the wide variety of 
households that populated shantytowns and tenements.39 In the shantytowns, 
in particular, it was common that families would live with relatives from dif-
ferent generations, or coming from the provinces, thus a single household 
would often include parents, children, grandparents, and/or aunts, uncles, 
and cousins. This led to a particularly wide range of units – a challenge in 
terms of design. Regarding the terraces, the design team sought to recreate 
in these the ground-floor courtyards that the residents had identified as one 
of the main reasons they preferred living in houses instead of flats. Given the 
number of families and the land available, density of the population made 
it impossible to offer houses instead of apartment units to the families. As a 
compromise, the flats incorporated parrillas (Argentine grills for barbeques) 
and large spaces for tables and chairs in their terraced entrances in an attempt 
to recreate some of the aspects and spatial qualities typical of the ground 
floor. Regarding the internal layout, internal corridors and partitions that 
often featured in more traditional middle-class housing designs were replaced 
with large, open spaces, as the families had specifically requested. Bedroom 
doors thus opened directly into the public spaces of the house.40
A second aspect that reflected the design team’s engagement with the 
residents’ needs was the priority given to the permanence of the families in 
the area. This position not only recognized the importance of the neighbor-
hood’s location in relation to the residents’ jobs, but also the significance of 
the networks of solidarity between families built over time, which played an 
important role in relation to everyday survival, cooperation, and political 
self-organization.41 The significance of staying in their locations in order to 
retain these community ties had been a key part of shantytowns’ struggles. 
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Finally, the design team endeavored to hire as many residents as possible, 
and for this, it devised technological solutions capable of being performed by 
unskilled labor. The most important of these was a system of pre-fabricated 
hollow brick panels, which were assembled near the working site and used 
for the external walls, accelerating construction. This approach went hand-
in-hand with residents’ claim that social housing should be constructed by 
state-supported, shantytown-led companies as opposed to large construction 
companies that were typically contracted to build social housing when not 
using the unpaid labor of shantytown residents.42 The residents who worked 
on the construction of Villa 7 were formally employed by the municipality 
at the request of the design team; in addition to being remunerated, they 
received employee benefits.43 In this way, the Pilot Plan can be read as an 
anticipated response to those criticisms focused on the exploitation of labor, 
normally addressed in the cases where the users’ contribution was unpaid for 
being considered part of their own investment. Furthermore, in the Pilot Plan 
the payment system by installments was also agreed between the residents, the 
municipality, and the design team.44 
In the Longer Run
The Pilot Plan represents a part of the debate about user participation in 
housing design that remains open: Who participates in the design process? To 
what extent do they participate? And who benefits from the process? Authors 
from Turner and Giancarlo de Carlo, in the 1960s and 1970s, to Peter 
Blundell Jones, Doina Petrescu, Jeremy Till and Camillo Boano today, have 
emphasized the importance of users’ creativity to generate housing and urban 
transformations.45 Well-known and regarded contemporary architectural 
practices have also engaged in this discourse. Elemental (led by Alejandro 
Aravena), for example, claims to have developed a user-centered approach, 
while Nishat Awan, Tatjana Schneider, and Jeremy Till have explored the 
significance of the concept of agency for spatial production.46 On the other 
hand, the importance of the role of the state has been underlined by authors 
like Emilio Pradilla and Rod Burgess in the 1970s and 1980s.47 Their writings 
were a response to those of Turner and were motivated by the concern that 
an over-celebration of users’ input could serve as an excuse for the retreat of 
the state and/or the exploitation of the users’ labor. The Pilot Plan for Villa 
7 shows, however, that government support and popular housing production 
are not necessarily incompatible, and that their respective roles in the project 
depend on the political conceptions that support it. 
The initial conception of the Pilot Plan for Villa 7 by the leading architects 
as a pilot phase – that is, an experimental approach to be replicated in other 
shantytowns – was both a failure and a success. It can be considered a failure 
because, as explained earlier, the military dictatorship then in power had 
closed all channels for popular participation in shaping the design of housing 
and urban space, more generally. At the same time, it is possible to argue 
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that it was successful, given the fact that the executed plan demonstrated the 
feasibility of integrating both the residents’ and professionals’ designs while 
keeping the parameters of cost, timing, and construction quality within the 
required standards. In addition, municipal employees who had only been 
exposed to planning methods employed in previous housing initiatives found 
a new way to intervene in the shantytowns and thoroughly engaged with this 
new approach. While the Pilot Plan was being implemented, for example, the 
Municipal Housing Institute developed a system called mesas de trabajo, or 
working boards, whereby residents and municipal members of staff regularly 
gathered to discuss solutions to the most pressing issues faced by shanty-
towns. This system was intended to scale up the Pilot Plan’s participatory 
design process and captured the attention of the architectural profession 
beyond the dissemination of the Plan.48 In other words, despite not being able 
to immediately implement these new techniques, given the restrictions of the 
dictatorship, residents and specialists retained their knowledge of the suc-
cesses of the Pilot Plan, with the hope of being able to use it within a different 
political landscape at some point in the future.49 
The Pilot Plan stands today as an example of participatory design that 
remains unique in its incorporation of all the residents into the decision-
making process. The phrase “participatory design” has become ubiquitous 
and arguably overused today, employed to refer to processes that range from 
consultation to self-construction. In some national contexts, for example, 
“participation” is a formal requirement of planning processes, and yet very 
often it scarcely extends beyond informed consent and consultation.50 By 
looking at a historical example in Latin America which remains yet unparal-
leled in the depth of its commitment to participatory practices, this article 
has sought to bring fresh light to a long-term discussion which is far from 
being exhausted. More specifically, the article has sought to highlight the fact 
that by including both professional and residents’ decisions at each stage of 
the project in a politically conscious way, and by formally remunerating the 
residents for their labor in the production of the housing, it is possible for 
residents, technicians, and state to collaborate jointly in the production of 
housing. In other words, the Pilot Plan for Villa 7 can be read as a demon-
stration that residents’ creativity and state intervention are not necessarily 
opposing forces but rather, different perspectives that can be reconciled and 
articulated through a proposal that stems from user demands coupled with 
political will. In a world where urban poverty and housing shortages continue 
to exist, joint efforts to find solutions to these problems within each unique 
political context are more than necessary.
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